It is a well-regarded point of “folk” morality that we ought to keep our promises. Most of us not only appreciate dependability in others, we also look for it in choosing our friends and long-term companions. In general, keeping promises is morally preferable, if not always required. There are certainly times when morality may require us to break a promise in order to fulfill some other, more important good. Nonetheless, “I ought to keep my promises” is a good rule of thumb and an important part of forming meaningful relationships and living a happy life.
Some ethical theorists have suggested that our obligation to keep promises is not as “black and white” as common-sense morality would lead us to believe. Certain metaphysical claims support the notion that our obligation to keep promises is a matter of degree, to the extent that we sometimes have no such obligation whatsoever. We will consider the metaphysical underpinnings of this view later. For now, we will focus on what is meant by the claim that promise-keeping is a matter of degree, as well as the impact of this perspective on everyday ethics.
To say that something is a matter of degree is to claim that it is not an absolute, but has a range that it falls within. Much like temperature has a range of degrees, moral concepts and philosophical ideas are sometimes also matters of degree and not “all or nothing” viewpoints. Usually, when something is a matter of degree, its significance relies on some further fact and is determined in direct proportion to that fact. The notion that our obligation to keep promises is a matter of degree is dependent upon the further fact of individual identity. We will consider this more at a later time.
Before we move on to the metaphysical concepts that support this idea that certain moral claims are matters of degree, we should consider the plausibility of such a notion to our everyday moral sense. As is often the case in philosophy, an example is helpful.
Suppose I have a close friend who has engaged in some questionable, though ultimately harmless activities, smoking marijuana for example. This friend, concerned with his own safety and slightly paranoid from all the pot, asks me to promise that I will never betray him to any legal authorities. Believing that my friend is acting on his paranoia and referring primarily to his marijuana use, I agree to this promise.
Imagine if this same friend were to move on to heavier drugs and begin robbing and harming others in order to feed his habit. I am fully aware of his illegal activities, but I have made a promise to never betray him to legal authorities. Would it be an immoral act if I were to break this promise and inform the police of my friend’s whereabouts and activities?
Most people, hopefully, would say no. In this case, my actions are motivated by concern for my friend and by an effort to prevent unnecessary harm to innocent people. Although my promise is still relevant, it has lost strength in light of other circumstances. The original promise is somewhat detached from current conditions, and it is arguably far more objectionable to keep the promise than to betray my friend.
Although this is not the specific example that we will discuss later, it appropriately illustrates the notion that certain moral rules are, in fact, matters of degree. Morality does dictate that I have some obligation to keep my original promise, but this must be balanced against other factors, such as concern for my friend and the well-being of innocent bystanders. Rather than a straightforward moral law, the moral requirement of keeping my promises is a matter of degree that is dependent upon other factors.
Our example will prove useful when we consider the metaphysical concerns associated with personal identity, and how they further support the notion that moral rules can be matters of degree. For now, it is helpful to simply note that moral rules as matters of degree is not the crazy notion that it seems. In some sense, it represents the kind of moral decision making that most of us already utilize.
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